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Introduction
It is often difficult to recognize the moment when a simple action creates exponential consequences, as people require time and perspective to assess change.
History marks consequential moments retrospectively, but when a person lives in the midst of revolutionary change, trying to sort out cause and effect in perspective becomes nearly impossible as constants become variable and consequences become outcomes. Experts offer that we live in times of an information revolution where the rapid adoption of powerful new technologies is changing the foundations of society, and where the convergence of people and new electronically enabled tools makes "seeing the elephant" even more daunting. Manuel Castells of Catalonia University writes that the past three decades of the Information Revolution is changing the structure of society, but that technology itself is not a sufficient condition alone to cause change because technology requires utility to be relevant. 3 Castells offers that people are the critical determinants of change be it technological, intellectual, or social, and when technology enables people to overcome barriers and challenge the status-quo, history often makes note of that too. The diffusion of technology that is transforming warfare is also reshaping global politics. Social media can catalyze protests in days that popular movements once took months or years to build. The penetration of mobile technology especially in developing nations will dramatically increase the number of people able to access and share information rapidly. The ubiquity of personal communications devices with camera and full motion video also allows much of the world to observe unfolding events in real time, rendering future operations increasingly sensitive to popular perceptions. As we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, military actions will receive intense media scrutiny, a dynamic that potentially invests otherwise inconsequential actions with strategic importance. 5 As a predictive framework, Joint Force 2020 seeks to identify the conditions of the future environment, but the challenge remains daunting as military leaders seek to define change by the manifestation of its consequences and outcomes. As such, Joint
Force 2020 attributes remarkably powerful forces to the diffusion of new technologies, saying that they are "transforming warfare and reshaping global politics." 6 While there is no argument that Information Revolution technologies advanced the means of war, this paper will analyze the assertion that social networks act as a catalyst for change and why the diffusion of mobile technologies presents a challenge to future operations in terms of organizational trust more than simply increased scrutiny. Military leaders need to understand and appreciate the sociological processes enabling this new medium, as emerging technologies will expand these networks and when this happened previously, the outcome did not bode well for those in power. announced Ahmadinejad the victor, the mowj-e sabz movement organized protests to annul the election's results. 20 Initially, the protests were peaceful as thousands marched in the streets of Tehran and other major cities, but they turned violent after the ruling government banned demonstrations and police turned on the protesters. While political protests that turn violent are often newsworthy, what made this incident unique was its manifestation through a then new Internet application called Twitter. 21 Also unique to 8 this event was the ability of protestors to rapidly produce and globally distribute their words, images, and full-motion video through next generation, Internet accessible "smartphones" that enabled broadcast through the Internet without the use of a fixedline computer connection. 22 As the protests developed, international media organizations, which were either prevented from reporting or denied access, followed events vicariously through the Internet. As media reported more and more events, peer-to-peer social network users Internet website did little to stem the outward flow of information. 25 The protests in Iran continued for months, but lost their momentum as the ruling government eventually disrupted social communication mediums and arrested protest organizers, but not before suffering significant criticism and loss of credibility in front of a global audience.
In both the Chinese and Iranian examples, affected governments reacted to a groundswell of unconstrained public outcry through mediums that the government had sanctioned in pursuit of the positive "leapfrog" capabilities they offered. When citizens used these technologies as a means to counter the ruling government's hold on power, the people's unconstrained comments, postings and protests highlighted long-standing issues of public trust and confidence. In retrospect, these incidents did little more than temporarily disrupt the ability of these governments to control their internal information environments, and both China and Iran subsequently instituted far more restrictive public communications policies in the aftermath through the creation of China's "Great
Firewall" and Iran's "Second Internet" to prevent this kind of disruptive activity in the future. 26 The question then is whether information technologies can create real social or political change, or is it just a means to propagate rancorous public disruption?
In addressing this question, Joint Force 2020 cites social networking as a catalyst that can accelerate and amplify public protest to create political change faster than previously possible. This perspective is likely a reference to the events of the Arab Spring in 2011. While western press and social media providers were quick to ascribe social networking as a principle cause contributing to the overthrow of regimes in offers that associating the speed of technologically facilitated unrest distracts from the reality that there were long standing social and political issues that lay unresolved for years prior to the Arab Spring. 29 Anderson continues that there was little in common between the "rural protagonists in Tunisia, and the educated youth of Cairo," but the key elements of systemic corruption and a perceived inequity in both countries led to the 11 motivation for popular change. 30 Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic Studies agrees while providing that long neglected social and political issues created the conditions for revolt in both Tunisia and Egypt. Moreover he also offers that a "youth bulge" amplified pattern neglect across the MENA. This pattern created a disenfranchised majority population unwilling to tolerate the endemic "corruption, cronyism and nepotism," that defined much of the region. 
Weak-ties and Dunbar's 150
Professor Mark Granovetter of Johns Hopkins University wrote his seminal piece on "weak-ties" in 1973, almost 30 years before the launch of Facebook. 35 His research demonstrated that small-scale social interactions (micro) can form large-scale patters of social behavior (macro), and that interpersonal relationships provide an effective bridge from this micro to macro social transaction phenomenon. 36 He further offered that two rudimentary relationships define societies, those bound by strong-ties (families and hierarchies) and those by weak-ties (friends and acquaintances). Strong-tie relationships differentiate from weak-ties though frequency (time), emotional intensity, mutual trust, and reciprocity. 37 These two fundamental types of interactions form the foundations of a society. While strong-ties are by far the more resilient of the two, social information transits along dispersed weak-tie networks more efficiently, thus providing the means by which rumors, news and information intermingle within societies. 38 Granovetter offered that diffusion studies show that "people rarely act upon mass-media information unless it is also transmitted through personal ties...otherwise people have no particular reason to think an advertised product or organization should be taken seriously." 39 What he implied in this statement is that information is innocuous unless someone within a social network perceives its value and acts upon it, and further that information originating from strong-tie networks carries enhanced credibility due to the nature of the source. He concluded his paper that micro linkages within societies are indispensable as they form the fabric of social interaction that integrates strong-tie groups to the wider society and are therefore vital to the function of collective benefit derived from wider social groups. 40 Granovetter's study explains the foundations for technologically enabled social networks and further provides that this new medium anchors upon fundamental human social behavior much the same way that news media, commercial markets and 43 He also stated that we intuitively place individuals beyond the core group into manageable categories based upon distance, frequency of contact, emotional closeness and potential reciprocity within the relationship. 44 Reciprocity potential also relates to altruistic behaviors in as much that we behave most selflessly within familial relations or Granovetter's strong-tie clusters.
Dunbar cites Granovetter's work in explaining how information flows in and beyond the core group, citing how the frequency of interaction between groups affects the efficiency of information exchange. Spring expanded so rapidly. These events resonated along weak-tie networks, and that resonance enhanced the form and functionality of the social network. Unfortunately, for the governments involved in these events, the groundswell of resonant social conversation was negative and largely derived from a lack of trust and confidence in authorities to act upon the best interests of their populations. As both Granovetter's and According to Professor Joshua Greene, people process visual images emotionally in the ventromedial cortex of the brain, but the brain processes other forms of information like text and data in the more rational, prefrontal cortex. 49 The prefrontal cortex is the part of the brain that helps work out the difference between right and wrong in moral or ethical dilemmas, but the ventromedial cortex processes images emotionally with less logical evaluation. 50 Visual imagery supports good-of-the-one choices, while verbal and textual processing supports rational, utilitarian good-of-the-many decisions. accessible social networks provide is insight into the fora of weak-tie social interaction.
As these networks are virtual public spaces, it is possible to measure public sentiment, support or even agitation holistically. A recently released RAND study investigated social network activity in Iran during the 2009 election unrest, and detailed the ebb and flow of Iranian public sentiment throughout the crisis. 55 Leveraging the availability of subject defined, Internet based, social networking content, the RAND study successfully measured Iranian public sentiment by tracking evocative or provocative word choice on public social networks. 56 This research along with other potential projects from research organizations like DARPA highlights potential opportunities to use social networks to gauge public sentiment by frequency of word choice within politically restrictive societies. 57 This research could be of potential value in dealing with rapidly developing security challenges, or measuring potential political volatility within populations.
Consequently, the Joint Force needs to incorporate strategic-level, social network monitoring within its intelligence and human terrain analysis enterprise to assess public sentiment within external populations, identify potential volatility, and potentially provide advance warning of unrest and social instability. 
